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Abstract 
Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) revealed that prices are preferred to quantities when marginal 
benefits are relatively flat compared to marginal costs. We extend this comparison to indexed policies, 
where quantities are proportional to an index, such as output. We find that policy preferences hinge on 
additional parameters describing the first and second moments of the index and the ex post optimal 
quantity level. When the ratio of these variables’ coefficients of variation divided by their correlation is 
less than two, indexed quantities are preferred to fixed quantities. A slightly more complex condition 
determines when indexed quantities are preferred to prices. Applied to the case of climate change, we find 
that quantities indexed to GDP are preferred to fixed quantities for about half of the 19 largest emitters, 
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Indexed Regulation 
Richard G. Newell and William A. Pizer ∗
1. Introduction 
The literature on policy instrument choice under uncertainty historically has focused on 
the relative performance of prices, quantities, and hybrid price–quantity instruments (Weitzman 
1974; Roberts and Spence 1976; Weitzman 1978; Yohe 1978; Stavins 1996; Pizer 2002; Newell 
and Pizer 2003). In practice, however, the decision for policymakers often comes down to 
choosing among different types of quantity-based instruments, not choosing between prices and 
quantities. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the current debate on the form and 
implementation of measures to address global climate change. While the Kyoto Protocol and the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme for carbon dioxide focus on a quantity-based 
system with fixed emissions targets, the United States and Australia have embraced targets based 
on emission intensity—a quantity target indexed to economic activity. Canada has committed to 
a quantity target under the Kyoto Protocol, but it is pursuing an intensity-based target in its 
domestic program. Few countries have chosen the relevant price instrument, a carbon tax, and 
this option is politically taboo in the United States.1
This paper considers the welfare implications of this indexed versus fixed quantity 
distinction and reveals a simple condition for preferring one to the other. When the coefficient of 
variation in the index divided by the coefficient of variation in the ex post optimal quantity level 
is less than twice their correlation, indexed quantities are preferred. Applying these results to the 
question of indexed versus fixed emissions limits to address global climate change, we find that 
indexed limits are preferred for about half the countries we examine, including the United States. 
Of course, interest in indexed and fixed quantity regulation is not limited to climate 
change. Environmental policy in the United States is replete with examples of both kinds of 
                                                 
∗ Newell and Pizer are Senior Fellows at Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. We thank Drew Baglino for 
research assistance and Carolyn Fischer, Ulf Moslener, John Parsons, Wally Oates, Brian McLean, David Evans, 
and participants in seminars at RFF, FEEM, HEC Montréal, and the Southern Economic Association Annual 
Meetings for useful comments on previous versions of the paper. We acknowledge funding from MISTRA, the 
Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research. 
1 New Zealand initially adopted then rejected a carbon tax; Japan recently considered but did not enact proposals for 
a carbon tax. Canada’s intensity-based approach also includes a price-based safety valve. 
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quantity policies. The most familiar example to many is the U.S. sulfur dioxide tradable permit 
or “cap-and-trade” system for electricity generators (Stavins 1998; Carlson et al. 2000). Since 
1995, this system has set a fixed limit on the tons of sulfur dioxide emitted from power plants, 
while allowing sources to trade emissions allowances in order to minimize compliance costs. The 
NOx Budget Program, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, and Clean Air Mercury Rule (all 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act), along with a 
host of regional air and water trading programs, round out the U.S. experience with fixed targets.  
Despite these examples, performance standards are a more common form of 
environmental regulation, typically set in terms of an allowable emissions rate per unit of 
product output (i.e., emission intensity) (Russell et al. 1986; Helfand 1991). The phase-down of 
lead in gasoline—the first large-scale experiment with market-based environmental policy—
employed a tradable performance standard (Nichols 1997; Kerr and Newell 2003). Eighteen 
states now have (and the U.S. Senate has proposed) renewable portfolio standards that require a 
certain share of electricity generation from renewable sources (Union of Concerned Scientists 
2005). Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are a less flexible performance 
standard that can be traded and banked within but not across firms (e.g., across vehicle lines 
within a firm). Even less flexible are traditional command-and-control style regulations, such as 
New Source Performance Standards. 
Like an intensity target for greenhouse gases, these forms of regulation allow the 
effective emissions cap to adjust in response to changes in output. This feature has political 
appeal because it provides a way to set environmental standards that are less likely to be, or 
perceived to be, constraints on economic growth, either within a regulated sector or across the 
economy. Intuition suggests that the responsiveness of intensity-based quantity regulation to 
output changes also may have economic appeal. Such adjustments could lower the expected 
costs of achieving a particular environmental target by loosening the cap when costs are 
unexpectedly high and tightening it when costs are low.2 This is analogous to the cost advantage 
of prices over quantities identified in the literature.  
On the other hand, including an index in the policy formula introduces another uncertain 
variable and potentially unrelated noise, which could have negative consequences on efficiency. 
                                                 
2 Linking an emissions limit to output raises questions of both subsidizing output and creating pro-cyclical costs, 
points we consider at the end of this paper. 
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The purpose of this paper is to clarify these tradeoffs by identifying the key features of the 
regulatory problem, modeling the relative performance of fixed versus indexed quantity targets, 
and applying the resulting framework to country-level data relevant for climate policy. We note 
now and at several later points that all of our theoretical results apply, almost without 
modification, to the case of indexed price policies, though the lack of both general support for 
price regulation and the absence of any real-world examples of indexed prices makes them less 
interesting.3
Several recent papers have looked both theoretically and empirically at the relative 
advantages of intensity targets in the case of climate change policy. Quirion (2005) presents a 
theoretical model with uncertain baseline emissions along with uncertainty in costs, observing 
that strong positive correlation favors indexed quantities, similar to our results. His analytic 
model differs from ours in that he focuses on a perfect index for baseline emissions, rather than a 
general index for cost shocks, and his overall conclusions are more qualitative. He argues that 
plausible assumptions imply indexed quantities typically lie between prices and quantities in 
terms of expected net benefits, a somewhat different result than our own. 
Focusing solely on costs (and ignoring benefits), Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) employ 
a simulation model to argue that partial indexing—what we call a general indexed quantity—is 
more sensible. Such an approach sets the mean emissions level and the rate of adjustment to the 
index separately, rather than allowing a single parameter (the emissions rate) to determine both.4 
Similar to Ellerman and Sue Wing, Jotzo and Pezzey (2005) derive an optimal indexing rule 
based on minimizing expected costs and use a simulation model to evaluate both a general 
indexed quantity policy and a ordinary, proportional indexed quantity policy. They conclude that 
for climate policy, indexes of either type are better than fixed quantity policies at a global level, 
that the more general index is considerably better than ordinary indexing, and that the rate of 
indexing varies greatly among countries. 
Finally, Sue Wing et al. (2005) conclude that sufficiently small GDP variance and high 
correlation favor indexed quantities for climate policy—as we do—but based on minimizing 
                                                 
3 The obvious exception being the large number of policies and contracts with nominal values indexed to inflation, 
as well as natural gas contracts that are sometimes indexed to crude oil prices. 
4 Compare   with and without the parameter a, where q is emissions, x is the index, and r is the rate of 
adjustment to the index. We address the distinction between general and ordinary (proportional) indexing further 
below.  
qar x =+
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expected costs rather than maximizing expected benefits minus costs. They also present 
empirical evidence supporting indexed quantities over fixed quantities, with strong support for 
developing countries and more equivocal results for industrialized countries. 
Our work ties together and clarifies this literature by deriving simple analytic expressions 
for the advantage of indexed quantities relative to both price and quantity controls. Three 
conditions lead to a preference for indexed quantities: positive correlation of the index and 
marginal abatement cost uncertainty, relatively small index variance, and sufficiently steep 
marginal benefits. The intuition is straightforward. With low correlation, indexing introduces 
unwanted noise in the target without reducing cost uncertainty. Further, a large index variance, 
relative to the marginal cost variance, will over-adjust quantities even if there is perfect 
correlation. Finally, if marginal benefits are flat, prices achieve the first-best outcome, leaving 
quantities—indexed or not—behind.  
Applying the analytic results to the case of climate change, we show the ranking of these 
instruments for major emitting countries using data from the Energy Information Administration 
and previous work on marginal costs and benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation. Prices are 
always preferred, but the ranking of indexed quantities and fixed quantity controls varies across 
countries. Those countries with a strong correlation between output and emissions and relatively 
low output variance favor indexed quantities, while those with low correlation and/or high output 
variance favor fixed quantities. Globally, indexed quantities outperform fixed quantity 
instruments. 
Our motivation and application relate to cases where the government is seeking to 
regulate a market constrained by both an information asymmetry (between the moment a policy 
is determined and the horizon over which it applies) and a limit on regulatory complexity. 
Similar features characterize other mechanism design problems where these results may be 
helpful. Sales contracts, for example, face an asymmetry of information between the moment a 
contract is agreed and when it is executed and, similarly, a limit to the complexity of contract 
contingencies. Like our regulatory example, subjecting delivery quantity and/or price to indexing 
rules can enhance contract performance (see, e.g., Li and Kouvelis 1999; Aase 2004; Neuhoff 
and van Hirschhausen 2005). In the case of monetary policy, the uncertain link between the 
instrument (current interest rate or money supply) and outcome (future inflation and output) 
mimics our information asymmetry. The literature on monetary policy considers ways to use all 
available information to improve performance but often ends up, like our regulatory example, 
with fairly simple linear index rules to minimize squared errors (see Svensson 2003 for a recent 
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summary). These examples suggest a potentially broad application of our analysis beyond the 
regulatory arena. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we set up our model and review 
the original Weitzman (1974) result. Next, we introduce the notion of indexed quantities and 
derive results for both a general indexed quantity—where the mean quantity level and rate of 
adjustment to the index are distinct—as well as a simple proportional indexed quantity. Finally, 
we present an application to climate change and conclude. 
2. Model and Analytic Results 
Our modeling approach follows Weitzman (1974) with quadratic cost and benefit 
functions for a generic market, q. The functions can be viewed as local approximations about an 
arbitrary point. Maximizing net benefits based on these functions, we determine expected net 
benefits for optimal price and fixed quantity controls, as in Weitzman, and then for an indexed 
quantity policy. We consider two types of indexed policies, “ordinary” indexed quantities where 
the regulated quantity equals a fixed rate times the index, and “general” indexed quantities where 
the rate of adjustment is distinct from the mean level of control. We derive expressions for the 
difference in net benefits for pair-wise comparisons of the policies, evaluate the dependence of 
these policy rankings on key parameters, and summarize these rankings in a two-dimensional 
space defined by key parameter values.  
2.1. Review of Prices versus Quantities 
We start by replicating the basic Weitzman (1974) results with costs and benefits 
measured as quadratic functions about the expected optimal quantity  .
* q 5 Costs are given by 





C q c c qq qq θ =+ − − + − , 
where  c θ  is a mean-zero random shock to marginal costs with variance 
2
c σ , and the cn 
parameters capture constant, linear, and quadratic behavior. We assume  ; that is, costs are 
strictly convex. Note that we have defined the cost shock such that a positive value of 
2 0 c >
c θ  reduces 
                                                 
5 Like Weitzman, we make the approximation around the optimal fixed quantity q
* without loss of generality for the 
resulting comparative advantage expressions. A more general approximation simply adds constant terms to all of the 
expected net benefit expressions, which cancel out when they are compared. 
5 Resources for the Future  Newell and Pizer 
the marginal cost of producing q, but increases the marginal cost of reducing q. We chose this 
specification to ease the interpretation for our application to pollution control, where the 
regulator typically is seeking emissions reductions. 
Similar to costs, benefits are given by the form 




B qbb q q q q =+ − − − , 
with  ; that is, benefits are weakly concave (marginal benefits are non-increasing). We 
ignore benefit uncertainty because, unless it is correlated with cost uncertainty, it does not affect 
net benefits in this quadratic setting (Weitzman 1974; Stavins 1996). The remaining parameters, 
particularly the linear terms, can be negative. This is relevant for our motivating example of 
pollution where marginal benefits are negative, and increasingly so, for increases in q. 
2 0 b ≥
Differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to q to obtain marginal costs and benefits, taking 
expectations, and equating the expressions, yields the condition 
  ( ) ( )
**
12 12 bbqq c cqq −− = +− , 
for the optimal fixed quantity policy, a condition satisfied at q = q
* if and only if b1 = c1. We 
now see the implication of our initial assumption that benefits and costs were approximated 
around the optimal fixed quantity policy, q
*. That is, b1 = c1; marginal benefits equal expected 
marginal costs at the optimum. Expected net benefits under the optimal fixed quantity policy, 
NBQ, are given by 
(3)  00 Q E NB b c ⎡⎤ = − ⎣⎦ . 
An arbitrary price policy p equates marginal cost to price, ex post. That is, 
(
*
12 c ) p cc q q θ =−+ − , with an associated quantity response function of 
() ( )
*
1 pc c qq p c θ =+− + 2 c θ . The optimal price policy, 
* p , equates marginal benefits and 








θ = + , 
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with the implication that the optimal price equals the expected price at the optimal fixed quantity 
and yields the optimal fixed quantity in expectation. Expected net benefits under the optimal 















Taking the difference between E[NBP] and E[NBQ] yields the familiar Weitzman (1974) 
















Prices outperform fixed quantities if the slope of marginal benefits is less than the slope 
of marginal costs, and vice versa. 
At this point, it is useful to define both the first-best policy and the associated net 
benefits. Setting marginal costs equal to marginal benefits after the shock  c θ  is revealed yields 











Intuitively, the sum of the cost and benefit slopes c2 + b2 reflects the rate at which a deviation in 
quantities translates into a deviation in net benefits, where here the net benefit deviation equals 












Graphically, we can visualize the outcomes under the first-best, price, and fixed quantity 
policies in Figure 1 for a particular realization of  c θ . The hatched area represents the loss under 
the fixed quantity policy and the shaded area represents the loss under the price policy, both 
relative to the first best. From the figure, we can see that while the price policy misses the 
optimum because it over-adjusts the expected quantity target, the fixed quantity policy misses the 
optimum because it fails to adjust at all in response to the cost shock.  
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The divergence in performance of price and quantity controls from the optimum and from 
one another arises because of an information asymmetry. The regulator does not observe the cost 
shock  c θ  that, in contrast, is known to the regulated firms at the time q is chosen. Once the 
information is revealed, it is not possible to rapidly adjust the policy, and we find that fixed 
policies lead to second-best outcomes with the well-known distinction between prices and 
quantities.  
An important observation at this point is that an alternate policy could improve upon both 
fixed prices and quantities if somehow it adjusted the ex post quantity level in a way that was 
closer to the optimum than either of these instruments. In this regard, three things are 
immediately necessary: the adjustment should be correlated to the cost shock; the adjustment 
should not be too small; and it especially should not be too large.6 We now turn to how indexed 
quantities might achieve this end.  
2.2. General Indexed Quantities 
We consider a random variable, x, that is used to index the otherwise fixed quantity 
policy. In the pollution case, it is useful to think of x as some index of activity, such as output, 
that is correlated with the level of unregulated pollution. More generally, it could be anything 
related to the object of regulation, q, including weather or prices in related markets. We assume a 
linear policy of the form  
(9)  ( ) qx a r x = + , 
where a and r are policy parameters,  [ ] E xx = ,  ( )
2 var x x σ = , and  ( ) cov , c x c x θ σ = . That is, the 
index has mean x , standard deviation  x σ , and covariance  cx σ  with the cost shock  c θ .  
As an example of an indexed quantity policy, the U.S. phase-down of lead in gasoline 
established rate limits in terms of grams of lead per gallon of gasoline, with the eventual quantity 
limit equaling the fixed rate times the volume of gasoline produced. The volume of gasoline 
represented an unknown, random variable to the regulator at the time of regulation and 
introduced variation in the ex post quantity of lead released into the environment. 
                                                 
6 It is also necessary that information about the index become available alongside information about the shock. 
Learning about an index adjustment after firms have made their final decision about q is of little use. 
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We consider two types of policies, a general indexed quantity (GIQ) policy where no 
restrictions are placed on the parameters a and r, and an ordinary indexed quantity (or just 
indexed quantity, IQ) policy where we constrain a = 0. In practice, the latter is the more common 
form of regulation, where the regulated level of q is simply a multiple r of random variable x, as 
in the U.S. phase-down of lead in gasoline. Substituting the indexed quantity rule (9) into our 
benefit and cost expressions (1) and (2) and maximizing expected net benefits with respect to r 
and a first, and then only with respect to r while constraining a = 0, yields the optimal form of 
the GIQ and indexed quantity policies, respectively 
(10)  ( ) ( )
** * *
GIQ qx q r x x = +− , and 
(11)  ( )
**
IQ qxr x = , 
where  () ()
** 2
22 cx x rb c σσ =+ ,  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 *2 * 2 * * 1 xx q x v r
−
=+ + rv , and  xx vx σ =  (the coefficient of 
variation in x). For the remainder of this section, we focus on the GIQ policy, returning to 
discuss the ordinary indexed quantity policy in the next section. 
The parameter r
** equals the coefficient of a regression of the first-best optimal 
adjustment ( ( ) 22 c bc θ +  from (7)) on x. Therefore, we can interpret the GIQ policy as the best 
linear predictor of the first-best adjustment, given x. If x and θc are jointly normal, the GIQ 
policy is also the minimum variance unbiased predictor (i.e., including the possibility of non-
linear predictors). This result easily is extended to the case of multiple index variables, where x 
would be a vector of index variables and r
** would be a vector of regression coefficients. 







GIQ cx EN B b c
cb
σ
ρ ⎡⎤ =−+ ⎣⎦ +
, 
where  () cx cx x c ρ σσ σ = , the correlation of x and  c θ . Comparing this to the net benefits under the 
first-best policy given in (8), we can see that the GIQ policy achieves the first best if  1 cx ρ = , that 
is, if the index and cost shock are correlated perfectly. In other words, if we have an exogenous, 
observable index variable that perfectly reveals the cost shock, the information problem that 
creates our second-best setting vanishes and we can implement a first-best policy.  
More generally, the gain from the GIQ policy will depend on the squared correlation, 
which can be interpreted as the goodness of fit (R
2) of a regression of the first-best optimal 
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adjustment on the index. Thus, the degree to which the index can predict the underlying cost 
shock, in terms of predicted versus residual variation, determines the degree to which the 
indexed policy achieves the first-best result given in (8). Meanwhile, the GIQ policy is always at 








GIQ Q cx cb
σ
ρ − ∆= ≥
+
. 
This expression is always non-negative and tends to zero as the correlation goes to zero. Similar 
observations about the ability of the GIQ policy to always perform better than fixed quantities 
are made by both Jotzo and Pezzey (2005) and Sue Wing et al. (2005). 















⎜⎟ ∆= + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
The GIQ policy will therefore be preferred if benefits are sufficiently steep (as with a fixed 
quantity policy) or if correlation is high. Put another way, the preference for the GIQ policy 
versus prices is a competition between the relative flatness of marginal benefits (pushing  GIQ P − ∆  
negative) and the correlation between the index and the cost shock (pushing   positive).  GIQ P − ∆
Figure 2 shows the surplus diagram in Figure 1 but with the GIQ policy included (thickly 
outlined) for a case where it adjusts for roughly half of the observed cost shock. As indicated, the 
general indexed quantity policy will have an expected loss no larger than the quantity policy, but 
its advantage relative to the price policy hinges on the relative slopes and degree of correlation 
between the index and shock.  
While not the focus of this paper, we note that a generalized indexed price (GIP) policy 
of the form  () (
** * *
GIP ) p xp u x x =+ − also is possible, equaling the optimal fixed price policy 
plus an adjustment rate u
** times the deviation in the index from its expectation. As in the GIQ 
case, the optimal adjustment rate equals a regression coefficient but this time for the optimal ex 
post price regressed on the index. Similar to the relative advantage of the GIQ policy over fixed 
quantities, the relative advantage of the GIP policy over fixed prices equals the difference 
between the first-best welfare gain and the fixed price policy, times the correlation squared, 
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() ()
2 2
22 2 2 1 2 () GIP P c cx cb b c
2 σ ρ − ∆= + . As the correlation goes to unity, the GIP policy achieves 
the first-best outcome; as it tends to zero, it becomes the same as the fixed price policy. 
While it is easy to imagine general indexed quantities of the form (9), or even the general 
indexed prices noted above, in practice we see very few—much as we see very few price–
quantity hybrid policies along the lines of Roberts and Spence (1976) or Pizer (2002). For that 
reason, we now focus on the ordinary indexed quantity policies given by (11). 
2.3. (Ordinary) Indexed Quantities 
Consider the more common case in practice where the regulated quantity is strictly equal 
to a rate times the index variable, 
  ( ) IQ qxr x = , 
where we have imposed the constraint that a = 0 in (9). We noted above that the optimal indexed 
quantity rate is  














Like the optimal rate for the GIQ policy (r
**), the optimal indexed quantity rate r* can be 
interpreted as a regression coefficient when the first-best adjustment  ( ) 22 c cb θ +  is regressed on 
x—but this time with the constraint that a constant term is not included—a point we return to 
below.  
Expression (15) for r
* is a weighted average of two terms, 
* qx  and r
**, with the relative 
weight depending on the coefficient of variation of x. As the index variation becomes large, r
* 
tends to the GIQ regression coefficient r
** and the variance of the IQ and GIQ policies converge. 
As variation in the index tends to zero, r
* tends to 
* qx , and the mean of the IQ and GIQ (and 
fixed quantity) policies converge. Because r
* cannot simultaneously match both the mean and 
variance of the GIQ policy (unless it happens that a = 0 even when unconstrained), (15) 
represents the minimum variance solution given that there is only one rather than two flexible 
parameters. An implication, nonetheless, is that r
* does not generally yield q
* in expectation, as 
do the other policies, although it will be quite close in typical applications where vx is small.  
Using (15), we can derive the expected net benefits of the optimal indexed quantity, 
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qx x c x c
IQ x cx
xx
qx v v v bc





+ + ⎡⎤ =−− + ⎣⎦ ++ +
 
where we have defined  xx vx σ =  and  
(17)  ( ) ( )
*
*2 2 qc vb c σ =+ q , 
the coefficient of variation in the index and the ex post optimal quantity from (7), respectively.  
Arranged this way, the expression (16) highlights two important results. First, if there is 
no correlation between the index and the cost shock, the last term vanishes and variance in the 
index reduces expected net benefits based on the third term. This follows from Jensen’s 
inequality applied to the fact that net benefits (costs minus benefits) are a concave function of the 
regulated quantity level and that higher variance in the index implies higher variance in the 
indexed quantity level and lower expected net benefits. Second, for a given index variance—that 
is, holding the third term constant—correlation between the index and cost shock improves net 
benefits based on the fourth term. 




















⎜⎟ ⎡⎤ =−+ − − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, 
Note that  () ()
*
* xc x q vvq x r ρ =
* * , the ratio of the two terms being averaged to determine the 
index rate in (15). 
Comparing (12) and (18), we can see that the net benefit expression for ordinary indexed 
quantities is the same as for the GIQ policy, except that it contains an extra factor multiplying the 
third term. Holding other parameters fixed, increases in vx improve the performance of indexed 









beyond which further increases in vx worsen the performance of indexed quantities. When this 
condition is met exactly, the term in (outer) parentheses of (18) equals one and the expected 
welfare gain from the indexed quantity policy equals the expected gain from the GIQ policy. 
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How do we interpret the condition given in (19)? One way is to recall, as noted above, 
that  () ()
*
* xc x q vvq x r ρ =
* * , yielding the condition ( )
** * 1 qxr=  and, therefore, r
* = r
** from 
the definition of r
* in (15) . That is, the rate of adjustment is the same under the indexed quantity 
policy and the GIQ policy. As noted above, both r
** and r
* are regression coefficients in models 
predicting the first-best adjustment as a function of x, the former with a constant and the latter 
without.7 If the two regression coefficients happen to be equal thanks to a lucky or thoughtful 
choice of the index variable, it implies also that the freely estimated constant a in the GIQ policy 
equals zero, the indexed quantity yields the same response function  ( ) qx as the GIQ policy, and 
it performs just as well. However, as ( )
* qxr
* *  diverges from unity, r
* diverges from r
**. This 
divergence reflects an increased importance of the non-zero constant term in the regression 
model, and the ordinary indexed policy does increasingly worse than the more flexible GIQ 
policy. 
As an alternative interpretation of (18) and the resulting condition (19), we can think 
about the “desired” value of vx for an indexed quantity policy, given the values of vq* and the 
correlation ρcx. How much variation should there be in the index in order to maximize net 
benefits? If an index’s correlation with the underlying cost shock is perfect, it makes sense to 
have the index vary by just as much as the ex post optimal quantity (i.e., vx = vq*). At the other 
extreme, when the correlation is zero, it is preferable to have an index with no variation because 
the index is all noise with respect to the cost shock and optimal quantity. Likewise, for cases 
between these two extremes, expression (19) reveals that as the correlation declines the desired 
variation in the index should also decline.  
As the level of index variation deviates from the desired level, the performance of the 
indexed quantity policy deteriorates. In particular, very noisy indexes will tend to a limiting net 












vI Q c x
cx q







⎜⎟ ⎡⎤ =−+ − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
                                                 
7 In general, a regression coefficient with and without a constant will be the same if the coefficient of variation of 
the explanatory variable equals the dependent variable’s coefficient of variation, times the correlation between the 
variables—exactly the condition in (19). 
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Indexes with too small a coefficient of variation, at worse, tend toward the fixed quantity result, 
a point we now confirm. 
2.4. The Advantage of Indexed Quantities Relative to Prices and Quantities 
We can now calculate the relative advantage of indexed quantities to prices and fixed 




















⎜⎟ ∆= − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
In terms of the parameter vx, this expression equals zero when vx equals zero, reaches a 
maximum of   when v GIQ Q − ∆ x = ρcxvq*, and then declines to  ( ) ( )
2
* 1 GIQ Q cx q v ρ
−
− ∆−  as  . x v →∞
Based on these tendencies, if  * 1 cx q v ρ ≥ , this expression is non-negative for all values of vx and 
indexed quantities are always at least as good as, and usually better than, fixed quantities.  
In all practical cases, however,  * 1 cx q v ρ < , because  1 cx ρ ≤  by definition and  * 1 q v <  unless 
the first-best optimum is highly variable relative to its mean—an unusual case that would in any 
event be inappropriate for the modeling framework we have set out. With  * 1 cx q v ρ < , indexing is 
preferred to fixed quantities so long as  ( ) ( ) ( )
2
* 21 xc x q c x q vv v ρρ <− * . We can simplify this 
condition by further focusing on cases where the variation is not only less than one, but relatively 
small (i.e.,  ), which leads to the approximate condition  * 1 q v   ( ) * 2 xc x q vv ρ <  for indexed 
quantities to be preferred. Such a focus already is implicit given the framing of our problem as a 
local quadratic approximation around the expected optimum and likewise seems reasonable for 
practical targets of regulation. 
The intuition for this latter condition is straightforward to understand. We previously 
observed that for parameter values satisfying  ( ) * 1 xc x q vv ρ =  the indexed quantity matches the 
GIQ policy. That is, the expression can be re-written as ( )
** * 1 qxr=  and the indexed quantity 
rate of adjustment r* equals the GIQ rate of adjustment r** based on (15). Now imagine 
parameter values whereby  () ( )
** *
* 2 xc x q vvq x r ρ = = , corresponding to the threshold condition 
for preferences between indexed and fixed quantities to flip. Under the noted assumption 
, we know   over the relevant range near   and therefore  * 1 q v   1 x v   * q v
** rq x ≈  based on (15). 
Under this assumption, the adjustment based on this rate is approximately double what it should 
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be compared to the GIQ policy (i.e., 
** *2 rr≈  ) and all the expected gains relative to the fixed 
quantity policy are squandered by overshooting the new expected optimum, as shown in Figure 
3. The surprisingly simple result that the point of indifference between indexing and fixed 
quantities occurs at 
** *2 rr≈  is attributable to the linear marginal form assumptions, which 
imply that equal-sized positive and negative deviations from the optimum have equal and 
opposite effects on marginal net benefits.8  
When vq* and vx are closer to one, r
* is an average of 
* qx  and r
**
 based on (15), 
reflecting the fact that we are willing to trade off higher mean error to better match variance and 
reduce the mean-squared error.  Therefore,  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  can actually be slightly larger than 2 
before indexed quantities squander their gain over fixed quantities. Specifically, for values of 
() ( )
2
* 21 cx q v ρ −  or smaller, indexed quantities continue to be preferred. 



















⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∆= − + − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
Based on the expression in outer parentheses, the sign of  IQ P − ∆  is positive or negative depending 
on whether (
2
22 bc )  is greater or less than  () () () ( )
2 1 22
* 11 1 1 cx x x cx q vv v ρρ
− ⎛⎞ −− + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. The 
expression can be viewed as a parabola-like function in  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ , with a maximum at 
() * 1 xc x q vv ρ = , where it equals ()
2 2
22 1 cx bc ρ −+  and where  IQ P GIQ P − − ∆ =∆  (matching the 
general indexed quantity policy comparison). Thus indexed quantities are preferred to prices 
when marginal benefits are relatively steep and/or when correlation with the index is high, as 
was the case comparing the GIQ policy to prices. 
As  () * xc x q vv ρ  deviates from 1, the relative performance of the indexed quantity policy 
worsens and the expression in outer parentheses of (21) tends to 
() ( ( )
2 2 2
22 * 11 1 cx cx q bc v ρρ −+ − )  for values of   (treating  x v →∞ * cx q v ρ  as fixed) and equals 
                                                 
8 Note that if marginal costs are convex, the critical value would be more than 2; conversely, if marginal benefits are 
convex, the critical value would be less than 2. 
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()
2
22 1 bc −  when vx = 0. Whether indexed quantities prevail over prices depends on the degree 
of correlation between the index and cost shock and/or steepness of marginal benefits, as well as 
whether  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  is sufficiently close to 1. 
2.5. Summary of the Relative Advantages of Alternate Policies 
We can summarize the relative advantages of indexed quantities, prices, and fixed 
quantities in a two-dimensional space. The space is defined by the squared ratio of marginal 
benefit /cost slopes along the y-axis, and the expression  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ , measuring how closely 
indexed quantities match the GIQ policy, along the x-axis. Figure 4 shows each relative 
advantage relationship separately. In the top panel, we show a horizontal line where ()
2
22 1 bc = . 
Above this line, fixed quantities are preferred to prices and below it prices are preferred to fixed 
quantities—this is the Weitzman (1974) result.  
In the middle panel we show a vertical line at  ( ) ( ) ( )
2
** 21 2 xc x q c x q vv v ρρ = −≈  based on 
(20). For cases where  () ( ) ( )
2
* 21 xc x q c x q vv v ρρ <− *  indexed quantities are preferred to fixed 
quantities; for the reverse, fixed quantities are preferred. The rough intuition for the fixed versus 
indexed quantity result is that indexed quantities are an improvement unless they adjust by more 
than about twice the desired amount conditional on x—with the desired amount arising where 
() * 1 xc x q vv ρ =  (i.e., where indexed quantities replicate the GIQ policy). 
Finally, the bottom panel shows the nearly parabolic function defined by (21) describing 
the boundary between a preference for prices over indexed quantities (below the curve) and a 
preference for indexed quantities over prices (above the curve). Here, losses relative to the first-
best outcome under the price policy depend on the distance from the x-axis—the ratio 
(
2
22 bc ) —with relatively steep marginal benefits disfavoring prices. Meanwhile, losses under 
indexed quantities depend on a more complex relationship involving both the correlation 
between index and the cost shock (ρcx) and the difference between  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  and its most 
favorable value of 1—with high values of 
2
cx ρ  and values of  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ close to 1 favoring 
indexed quantities. The locus of points where these losses are equivalent, and where prices and 
indexed quantities generate the same expected net benefits, defines the parabola-like function 
shown in the figure, passing through the points ( ) 0,1 , ( )
2 1,1 cx ρ − , and (approximately)  . 




22 bc )  is sufficiently large and  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  is sufficiently close to 1 to 
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favor indexed quantities. Note that the effect of ρcx on the policy comparison arises from both its 
scaling of  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  and its movement of the minimum of the parabola at 
2 1 cx ρ − . Based on (5) 
and particularly (16), however, we know that the unambiguous effect of higher values of ρcx 
(other things equal) is to tilt preferences towards indexed quantities.  
Figure 5 shows these relations together, distinguishing six regions where different policy 
rankings occur. Note that for the GIQ policy, we can look along a vertical line where 
() * 1 xc x q vv ρ =  to determine policy rankings. In that case, when ()
2 2
22 1 cx bc ρ <− , we have 
prices preferred to general indexed quantities preferred to quantities. When  ()
2 2
22 11 cx bc ρ >> − , 
general indexed quantities are preferred to prices are preferred to quantities. Finally, when 
()
2
22 1 bc > , indexed quantities are preferred to quantities are preferred to prices. In no instance 
is the fixed quantity policy preferred to index policies when  ( ) * 1 xc x q vv ρ = , as indexed 
quantities match the performance of the GIQ policy, and the GIQ policy is always (weakly) 
preferred to fixed quantities. 
Given five parameters—the marginal cost and benefit slopes, the coefficients of variation 
for the index and ex post optimal quantity, and the correlation between the latter two—we can 
identify a point in Figure 5 and determine the relative ranking of policies. We now consider an 
application of this approach to the case of climate change policy in a cross-section of countries. 
3. An Application to Environmental Policy 
In our application to climate change, we compare carbon dioxide (CO2) mitigation 
policies based on either fixing the price of emissions, the quantity of emissions, or the ratio of 
emissions to GDP (emissions intensity). We also present results for the general indexed quantity 
policy, even though such policies have not yet received serious consideration in national or 
international policy deliberations. Based on the results in section 0, the necessary parameters for 
understanding the relative advantage of these policies, given by equations (6), (13), (14), (20), 
and (21), are the marginal cost and benefit slopes (c2 and b2), the variance of the cost shock 
(
2
c σ ), the coefficients of variation of the index and ex post optimal quantity (vx and vq*), and the 
correlation of the cost shocks and the index (ρcx).  
In the remainder of this section, we first present a useful decomposition of the cost shock, 
then describe how we obtained the necessary parameter values, and finally present the resulting 
empirical results for a cross-section of countries. 
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3.1. Decomposition of Cost Shocks 
We begin by noting that a key feature of the problem, the cost shock, is more easily 
considered in two pieces―one owing to uncertainty about the cost of the production technology 
for shifting the regulated quantity away from its baseline level ( m θ ) and one owing to 
uncertainty about the baseline level itself ( q θ ) (Newell and Pizer 2003) 
(22)  2 cm c q θ θθ = + .  
Note that if the baseline shifts by  q θ , it is equivalent to a  2 q c θ  shift in marginal costs of 
achieving a particular quantity. The slope of the marginal cost function, c2, converts horizontal 
shocks into vertical shocks. Based on this decomposition, and assuming the two parts are 





q σ σσ =+ , 
Where 
2
m σ  and 
2
q σ  are the variances of  m θ  and  q θ , respectively. 
There are two other places in the relative advantage expressions where this 
decomposition is relevant. The first is where ρcx appears in expressions involving the index. 
Assuming the index is correlated with the baseline quantity level, but not the technology cost, 
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where σqx is the covariance and ρqx the correlation between the baseline component of the cost 
shock and the index. The last expression reflects the fact that the correlation between the cost 
shock and index now equals the correlation of the baseline quantity and the index, diminished by 
a factor of  ()
2
2 1 mq c σσ +  measuring the relative importance of the uncorrelated component 
σm. When the uncorrelated component is relatively small then ρcx will tend toward  qx ρ . When 
the reverse is true, and the variance of the uncorrelated piece is relative large then ρcx will tend 
toward 0.  
The second place where the decomposition is relevant is where vq* appears in expressions 
involving the indexed quantity policy. Using (17) and (23), vq* can be rewritten as 
















=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, 
where  qq vq σ =  is the coefficient of variation in the baseline quantity. Similar to (24), the 
coefficient of variation of the ex post optimal quantity equals the coefficient of variation of the 
baseline quantity, increased by a factor measuring the relative importance of the uncorrelated 
component σm as well as the ratio 
* qq(the latter correcting for the difference in means between 
q v  and  ).   * q v
We now turn to finding values for these and the remaining parameters. 
3.2. Climate Change Policy Parameters 
For all of the climate change parameters that are independent of national data on 
emissions and output, we follow the approach in Newell and Pizer (2003), updating the values to 




2 9.2 10  $/ton b
− =× 9 In order to determine 
* qq , we also use their definition of mitigation 
benefits to estimate a current level of marginal benefits of 2.4 $/ton—within rounding error of 
the value reported in Nordhaus (1994).10 Note that given the value of b2 and emissions levels on 
the order of billions (10
9) of tons for the largest countries, this marginal benefit estimate is nearly 
constant over the range of possible emissions levels.11
Based on results from 10 models that participated in the Energy Modeling Forum’s EMF 
16 (Weyant and Hill 1999), Newell and Pizer estimated that each 1 percent reduction in CO2 
raises marginal costs by 1.2 $/ton globally, with a standard deviation of 1.1 $/ton associated with 
a 1 percent reduction. In order to translate this marginal cost slope described in $/ton per 
percentage point terms into $/ton
2 terms, we divide by one percent of the baseline emissions 
level in the relevant region (i.e.,  2 1.1 (0.01 ) c = q
                                                
). This results in a range of marginal cost slopes 
 
9 Because CO2 is a highly persistent stock pollutant, the marginal benefit of reducing CO2 emissions reflects the 
discounted flow of reduced climate damages, which depreciate over time. 
10 Nordhaus reports a value of $6.77 per ton carbon in 2005 (Table 5.7). Adjusting for inflation and converting to 
tons of CO2 yields 2.44 $/ton. 
11 That is, 9.2 x 10
-13 $/ton
2 multiplied by some number of 10
9 tons is a negligible adjustment to 2.4 $/ton. 
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across countries (discussed below) from   to  .
82
2 2.0 10  $/ton c
− =×
7
2 4.5 10  $/ton c
− =×
2 12  In 
addition,  m σ  is set at 1.1 $/ton based on the standard deviation of marginal control costs across 
these models. Finally, from the earlier marginal benefit estimate of 2.4 $/ton, we determine that 
the optimal fixed quantity reduction, matching expected marginal cost to marginal benefit, is 
2.1% and thus 
* qq = 0.979. Table 1 summarizes the values for all parameters that are common 
across geographic regions.  
3.3. Country-level Emissions and GDP Data 
The remaining variables necessary for the relative advantage expressions are q ,  q v , vx, 
and ρqx. For these estimates, we focus on 19 countries that in 2002 contributed at least 1% to 
global CO2 emissions, as well as the world as a whole.13 The policies implicitly being modeled 
are therefore economy-wide policies at the national and global levels. We also consider the U.S. 
electricity sector by itself, with an implicit sectoral-level policy. Table 2 gives the 2002 
emissions, GDP, and emissions intensity for these countries, with the United States, China, 
Japan, and India being the largest emitters, at 23 percent, 14 percent, 5 percent, and 4 percent of 
global emissions, respectively.14 We use these 2002 values for emissions to approximate q  and 
report country-specific values of c2 in the last column of Table 2, where  2 1.1 (0.01 ) cq =  as 
explained above.  
To estimate values for  q v , vx, and ρqx, we posit a simple vector forecasting model for 
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where gq and gx are annual growth rates in emissions and output, and the εt’s are errors. Defined 
this way, and fixing policies for one period,  q v  is the standard deviation of the first error, vx is 
                                                 
12 This approach implicitly assumes that the production technology for CO2 reduction is identical and scalable 
across countries. While this is of course not strictly true, we think this yields a reasonable benchmark value for each 
country. Furthermore, we found that changing c2 or σm by an order of magnitude in either direction did not change 
the resulting policy rankings discussed below. 
13 We do not include Russia, Ukraine, and Germany because these countries went through major transitions in the 
last two decades, making their emissions and economic output data either unreliable or unavailable. 
14 Russia, which is not included here, accounts for 6 percent of the world total. 
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the standard deviation of the second, and ρqx is their covariance.15 We apply this model to 
country-level data over the period 1980–2002 on the quantity of CO2 emissions from the 
consumption and flaring of fossil fuels and economic output as measured by gross domestic 
product (Energy Information Administration 2004). With these estimates of  q v , vx, and ρqx, 
equations (23), (24), and (25) allow us to compute  c σ ,  cx ρ , and vq*, as well as the expression 
( ) * xc x q vv ρ  summarizing the degree to which the indexed quantity policy matches the GIQ 
policy. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 3.16  
Differences among countries are significant. The coefficient of variation in emissions 
predictions ranges from a low of 2.4 percent in the United States to a high of 7.2 percent in 
Poland, while the coefficient of variation in the output forecast ranges from a low of 1.4 percent 
in Italy to a high of 6.8 percent in Poland. The resulting values of  c σ —including variation due to 
uncertainty in both baseline emissions and the cost of achieving a given reduction level—ranges 
from about 3–8 $/ton across the countries. Note that the values for the world as a whole are 
slightly lower, reflecting the tendency of idiosyncratic shocks in different countries to average 
out. The values for the electricity sector in the United States tend to be quite similar to the United 
States as whole, reflecting that sector’s important role in both emissions and economic activity. 
The degree of correlation in baseline emissions and output ( qx ρ ) also varies widely 
across countries, from 0.10 in France, which obtains a large fraction of its electricity from 
nuclear, to 0.74 in China, which is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. The correlation is 0.70 for the 
United States as a whole and 0.84 for the U.S. electricity sector. Higher degrees of correlation 
indicate situations where indexed quantities have the potential to perform well.  
Estimates of  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  are presented in the last column of Table 3, measuring the 
deviation of the indexed quantity policy from the GIQ policy. Other things being equal, this 
expression is larger for countries with relatively high output variation or low correlation between 
output and emissions. Noting that indexed quantities perform best when this expression equals 
unity, we see that output variation is rarely too small (only for Korea). However, output variation 
                                                 
15 Because a small deviation in logs approximates the underlying deviation in levels, divided by the expected level, 
modeling in logs has the convenient effect of converting standard deviations into coefficients of variation and 
covariance into correlation (as long as the deviations are small). 
16 We do not report values of 
cx ρ , and vq*. Noting that 
2 0 b ≈ , 
* 1 qq≈ , and σm is relatively small, we know 
cx qx ρρ ≈  and 
* qq vv ≈  . 
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is large enough to cause a preference for quantities over indexed quantities for about half the 
countries, including Japan, France, Australia, and others, a point we now consider in more 
detail.17
3.4. The Relative Advantage of Alternate Climate Policies 
Taking the necessary parameter values from Table 1 through Table 3, and using (6), (13), 
(14), (20), and (21) to compute the relative advantage among various combinations of policies, 
Table 4 shows the results of this comparison for a one-year policy.18 Given the flatness of the 
marginal benefit function relative to the marginal cost function, the results reconfirm the 
universal preference for price policies over either fixed or indexed quantity policies (Newell and 
Pizer 2003). That is, all the results for  PQ − ∆  are positive and for  IQ P − ∆  and   are negative. 
We also confirm the result from (13) that the GIQ policy always is weakly preferred to the fixed 
quantity policy so that 
GIQ P − ∆
0 GIQ Q − ∆ ≥ . Finally, we note that for cases where the parameters in Table 
3 are relatively similar—for example, the U.S. electricity sector and the United States as a 
whole—the values in Table 4 will be proportional, being scaled by the level of baseline 
emissions in Table 2.19
The interesting calculation from the perspective of both theory and practice is the relative 
advantage ranking of indexed quantities over fixed quantities. From the aforementioned 
observations, it is the only comparison where the direction is unclear for climate policy. This 
comparison also is an important dimension of the climate change policy debate between the 
United States and the European Union. We see that this ranking varies across countries in direct 
correspondence with the extent to which the ratio in the last column of Table 3 is greater than or 
less than 2. When  () * 2 xc x q vv ρ >  because the coefficient of variation in output is relatively high 
compared to that of the ex post optimal emissions level, or their correlation is low, fixed 
quantities are preferred to quantities indexed by output. 
                                                 
17 Pizer (2005) compared the coefficient of variation in intensity and emissions to provide a crude argument in favor 
of targets based on one or the other. It can be shown that such a comparison is equivalent to comparing  ( ) xq x q vv ρ  
to 2 only if emissions and output have roughly the same coefficient of variation.  
18 See Newell and Pizer (2003) for a discussion of policies that last multiple periods; for simplicity, we focus on a 
policy lasting a single period. 
19 That is, the U.S. electricity sector comprises about 40 percent of U.S. emissions. Consequently, given 
approximately the same values in  , the relative advantage values for the U.S. electricity sector in   are 
about 40 percent of the U.S. values. 
Table 3 Table 4
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For about half the countries, including the two biggest emitters—the United States and 
China—indexed quantities yield higher expected net benefits than fixed quantities. For the other 
half, including the third and fourth biggest emitters examined—Japan and India—as well as the 
United Kingdom and France, fixed quantities dominate indexed quantities. At a global level, 
indexed quantities dominate. Most of the countries where indexing has a negative effect on net 
benefits have correlations of less than 0.25. The exceptions are Indonesia, Iran, Poland, and 
Saudi Arabia, which all have unusually high degrees of variation (above 4.5 percent) in 
economic output—to an extent where the disadvantage of high output variation outweighs the 
advantage of correlation.  
In countries where  ( ) * xc x q vv ρ  is close to unity, including Brazil, Italy, Korea, 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United States, the indexed quantity policy is close to the GIQ policy 
and the third and fourth columns are similar if not identical in Table 4. That is,   is equal to 
or very close to   (and the same for the comparison to price policies). As we have 
repeatedly emphasized, the key for indexed quantities is whether the index possesses just the 
right amount of variation, given the variation in the ex post optimum and their correlation. As 
noted above, the results in Table 4 also demonstrate the unambiguous dominance of the GIQ 
policy over ordinary indexing. The advantage of the GIQ policy over ordinary indexing is 
greatest when the index has the wrong amount of variation (e.g., Indonesia, Iran, Poland, and 
Saudi Arabia noted above). Moderating the degree to which these output fluctuations influence 
the index without upsetting the mean outcome is particularly advantageous.  
GIQ Q − ∆
IQ Q − ∆
4. Conclusion 
The relevance and importance of instrument choice for policy design never has been 
greater, particularly in the realm of environmental policy. With the increasing acceptance in 
policy circles of market-based instruments, especially tradable permits, attention has turned to 
the more subtle design elements of these instruments and how they might be refined. In addition, 
interest has risen in the properties of more traditional instruments, such as performance 
standards, when flexibility is introduced through trading (e.g., potential CAFE reforms in the 
United States). With the European Union and the United States currently on opposite sides of a 
debate over fixed versus indexed quantity policies, this interest is particularly intense in the 
realm of climate change. Such interest arises both in relation to the form that national 
commitments might take within an international framework and in the design of domestic 
implementing policies. 
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Our paper contributes to this debate by clarifying analytically how uncertainty in the 
costs of meeting particular policy targets might or might not be ameliorated by indexing fixed 
quantity policies to variables such as economic output. We find that the advantage of such 
indexing depends on a tradeoff between the introduction of an additional source of uncertainty—
which lowers expected net benefits—and the benefit-raising effect of adjusting the policy target 
ex post thanks to correlation of the index with the object of regulation. For typical cases where 
uncertainty is relatively small (variation in the ex post optimum of less than 10 percent of its 
mean), the preference for indexed over fixed quantities reduces to a question of whether the ratio 
of coefficients of variation of the index and the ex post optimal quantity, divided by their 
correlation, is less than two. This fundamentally is an empirical question for ordinary indexed 
quantity policies, where the quantity is strictly proportional to the index. A general indexed 
quantity policy, however, allows separate setting of the mean quantity level and rate of 
adjustment to the index, and such a policy will always dominate a fixed quantity policy from the 
perspective of maximizing expected net benefits. Comparisons to a price policy are more 
complex and involve the ratio of the slopes of marginal benefits and costs. 
These conclusions are subject to the caveat that we have chosen a deliberately simple 
model to focus in on what we believe to be one of the most important elements of the instrument 
choice question, namely cost uncertainty. We have abstracted from other relevant concerns, 
including the potential for an indexed quantity policy to create undesirable incentives if firms 
perceive that they can gain additional emissions rights by increasing their output.20 While we do 
not think this is a concern for national-level policies, it could be for indexed policies at the 
sectoral or product level. We also have not addressed the fact that quantities indexed to output, 
even if they reduce overall expected costs, may lead to worse outcomes when output is low and 
better outcomes when output is high. This type of pro-cyclical behavior may be undesirable from 
a macroeconomic perspective, although we suspect this concern is not large.21
Applying these conceptual insights and analytic formulae to the case of climate change 
policy across the biggest international emitters of CO2, we find that prices (i.e., carbon taxes) 
universally dominate both fixed and indexed quantities (i.e., tradable permits) from an efficiency 
                                                 
20 This is the typical form of a performance standard, such as the U.S. lead phase-down in gasoline. Alternatively, 
emissions rights could be increased for all firms based on aggregate output, diluting the effect. See Fischer (2003) 
for a discussion of these issues. 
21 This point is discussed in Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003). 
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perspective—reconfirming previous research. More interestingly, indexing quantities to 
economic output yields higher expected net benefits than fixed quantity policies for about half 
the countries we assessed, including the United States and China, as well as for the world taken 
as a whole. A more general indexed quantity policy, where the mean quantity level and rate of 
adjustment are distinct, can deliver significant gains relative to ordinary indexing for countries 
that have unusually high variance in economic output, such as Indonesia, Iran, Poland, and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Further work is needed to consider more accurate representations of costs, benefits, 
policies, and uncertainty and to address the robustness of these results. However, these results do 
indicate that alternate policies work better in different circumstances and that an international 
system that aspires to global efficiency through domestic policies may need to accommodate 
these differences. 
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Figure 1. Welfare Losses of Prices and Quantities Relative to Optimum 
(quantity loss is hatched; price loss is shaded) 
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Figure 2. Welfare Losses under Quantity, Price, and General Indexed Quantity Policies 
(quantity loss is hatched; price loss is shaded; indexed quantity loss thickly outlined) 
 
 

























































Figure 3. Welfare Losses under Quantity and Indexed Quantity Policies 
(quantity loss is hatched; indexed quantity loss is shaded) 
 






















































( ) * xc x q vv ρ
ratio of coefficients of variation in index and ex post 
























































( ) * xc x q vv ρ
ratio of coefficients of variation in index and ex post 






indexed quantities > prices
prices > indexed quantities 
















































( ) * xc x q vv ρ
ratio of coefficients of variation in index and ex post 
optimal quantity, divided by their correlation
 
Figure 4. Regions of Relative Advantage for Indexed Quantities, Prices, and Quantities 
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Figure 5. Regions of Relative Advantage for Indexed Quantities, Prices, and Quantities 
30 Resources for the Future  Newell and Pizer 
Table 1. Common Parameters in Relative Advantage Expressions 
Parameter Symbol  Value 
Marginal benefit slope  b2 9.2 × 10
-13 $/ton
2
Marginal cost slope 
(expressed in terms of % reductions) 
—  1.2 $/(ton × %) 
Cost shock standard error from models  σm 1.1 $/ton 
Optimal rate of quantity reduction 
* qq   0.979 
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Table 2. CO2 Emissions, Output, and Emissions Intensity; 2002 
(and implied marginal cost slope) 
Country 
Emissions (q ) 
(billion tons CO2) 
Output (x ) 
(trillion $ GDP) 
 Intensity (qx ) 
(tons per $1000 GDP) 
Marginal cost 
slope ( )  2 c
($/ton
2) 
Australia 0.41  0.55  0.88  2.8  × 10
-7
Brazil 0.35  0.95  0.43  3.4  × 10
-7
Canada 0.59  0.88  0.79  2.0  × 10
-7
China 3.32  1.42  2.75  3.5  × 10
-8
France 0.41  2.18  0.22  2.8  × 10
-7
India 1.03  0.63  1.92  1.1  × 10
-7
Indonesia 0.30  0.26  1.37  3.9  × 10
-7
Iran 0.36  0.17  2.52  3.2  × 10
-7
Italy 0.45  1.47  0.36  2.6  × 10
-7
Japan 1.18  6.60  0.21  9.8  × 10
-8
Korea (South)  0.45  0.80  0.66  2.6 × 10
-7
Mexico 0.36  0.44  0.97  3.2  × 10
-7
Netherlands 0.26  0.59 0.51  4.5  × 10
-7
Poland 0.27  0.20  1.60  4.3  × 10
-7
Saudi Arabia  0.33  0.17  2.26  3.5 × 10
-7
South Africa  0.38  0.21  2.07  3.1 × 10
-7
Spain 0.34  0.87  0.46  3.4  × 10
-7
United Kingdom  0.55  1.58  0.41  2.1 × 10
-7
United States  5.75  10.90  0.62  2.0 × 10
-8
U.S. Electricity  2.25  3.70  0.61  5.2 × 10
-8
World 24.53  41.46  0.59  4.7  × 10
-9
Note: U.S. electricity output and intensity measured in terms of trillions of kilowatt-hours. 
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( q v )
†





















Australia 0.026  0.016  0.20  3.1  3.1 
Brazil 0.046  0.032  0.72  5.1  1.0 
Canada 0.035  0.023  0.54  3.9  1.2 
China 0.030  0.030  0.74  3.5  1.4 
France 0.046  0.018  0.10  5.1  3.9 
India 0.040  0.021  0.20  4.5  2.6 
Indonesia 0.042  0.047  0.45  4.7 2.5 
Iran 0.052  0.066  0.51  5.8  2.5 
Italy 0.035  0.014  0.31  4.0  1.3 
Japan 0.037  0.028  0.19  4.2  4.0 
Korea (South)  0.062  0.036  0.65  6.8  0.9 
Mexico 0.048  0.034  0.53  5.4  1.3 
Netherlands 0.047 0.021  0.35  5.3  1.3 
Poland 0.072  0.068  0.40  8.0  2.4 
Saudi Arabia  0.045  0.045  0.42  5.0  2.4 
South Africa  0.040  0.022  0.19  4.5  3.0 
Spain 0.054  0.019  0.28  6.0  1.3 
United Kingdom  0.028  0.018  0.25  3.3  2.7 
United States  0.024  0.018  0.70  2.9  1.1 
U.S. Electricity  0.025  0.020  0.84  2.9  0.9 
World 0.014  0.011  0.55  1.9  1.4 
 
†Approximately equal to vq*, the coefficient of variation in the ex post optimal quantity level. See 
equation (25) with  , 
2 0 b ≈
* 1 qq≈ , and σm relatively small. 
‡Approximately equal to ρcx, the correlation coefficient between the index and the ex post optimal 
quantity level. See equation (24) with σm relatively small.  
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Table 4. Relative Advantage of Alternative Climate Change Policies ($millions) 
 
Country  PQ − ∆   IQ Q − ∆   GIQ Q − ∆   IQ P − ∆   GIQ P − ∆  
Australia  19  -2  1 -21 -18 
Brazil  44  22  22 -22 -22 
Canada  45  12  12 -33 -33 
China  195 85 96  -110  -99 
France  51  -4  1 -55 -51 
India  102 -5  4  -107  -98 
Indonesia  33  -7  6 -39 -26 
Iran  59 -15  15 -74 -44 
Italy  35  3  3 -32 -32 
Japan  102 -25  3  -128 -99 
Korea (South)  102  42  42 -60 -60 
Mexico  51  12  14 -39 -38 
Netherlands  35  4  4 -31 -31 
Poland  83  -9  13 -92 -70 
Saudi Arabia  40  -5  7 -45 -33 
South Africa  37  -3  1 -40 -35 
Spain  60  4  4 -56 -56 
United Kingdom  29  -2  2 -31 -27 
United States  230  97  97 -133 -133 
U.S. Electricity  91  55  56 -35 -35 
World  431  77  90 -354 -341 
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